Introduction
Over the last 25 years, Brazil has experienced profound economic changes. Following the international economic instability of the late 1970s and the debt crisis of the early 1980s, Brazil launched structural adjustment programmes with the intention of solving external account imbalances and controlling high inflation rates. In 1990, Brazil undertook a major break from a century-long era of importsubstitution strategy (ISI) that left its economy essentially closed towards the end of the 1980s, and introduced economic reforms involving trade and capital account liberalization, the privatization of state companies, the deregulation of markets and a successful stabilization plan. These reforms have been reshaping the economy very rapidly and are giving rise to economic transformations. Table 14 .1 shows, however, that the pre-reform per capita output growth rate is significantly higher than that of the post-reform period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . The social indicators are also disappointing. Poverty is at a very high level for a middle-income country and has been reduced only very slowly, while income inequality is not only at a very high level, but has also increased over time. To the extent that structural reforms are widely understood to be conducive to growth and be pro-poor, these statistics suggest that something went wrong.
Brazil is a country that is particularly well suited to grasping a better understanding of whether macroeconomic policies in general and structural reforms in particular favour the poor. Its economy ranks among the highest globally in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), and has experienced one of the highest average growth rates of the last century. However, it remains thoroughly rooted in the developing world. Socioeconomic inequality involves subtle forms of residential, educational and workplace discrimination that tends to segregate members of distinct socioeconomic strata, so that they live, work and circulate in different settings. The poor have limited -and at times no -access to government services such as health, education and sanitation and limited participation in the formal labour market. Consequently, they are generally not covered by labour legislation or by most social protection schemes. Poverty is widespread in urban and rural areas, reaching the highest levels in rural parts of the northeast region. Various forms of deprivation, growth of favelas (shanty towns), urban violence, street children and epidemics of diseases have been common not only in large, but also in medium-sized and small cities all over the country. The pervasiveness of high levels of poverty and inequality, along with the high concentration of land and property and low growth rates, have created tensions in rural and urban areas in the last few years. Pillaging and seizures of unused private land and urban properties fuelled conflicts in various parts of the country, especially in the poorest regions, as the numbers of landless workers increased. The rising social problems and the limited effectiveness of governmental policies to tackle the huge social problems raised concerns and uncertainties and a call for urgent policies to promote growth and create jobs.
This chapter reviews the recent economic policies and their impacts on the poor, and examines macro policies required to allow poverty reduction. I begin by presenting the economic policies of the following periods and their impacts on growth and the poor : 1980-89, 1990-2002 and 2003-04 . The split between the first and second periods is due to the major break of policy orientation from 1990 onwards. The last period seeks to examine whether the economic policy of President Lula da Silva favours the poor as compared to his predecessors. This is followed by a discussion of macroeconomic policy alternatives that can lead Brazil towards a faster and more equitable growth and rapid poverty reduction. The chapter concludes with some final remarks and the lessons drawn from Brazil's case.
The 1980-1989 period
The economic policy A brief description of the economic policy orientation in previous decades is helpful as they set the starting conditions for the 1980s. The closure of international markets to Latin American goods during the Great Depression encouraged a shift from export-oriented to domestic-oriented economies. In Brazil, it encouraged a drive towards industrialization, which was already underway, and towards a greater role of the state in the economy. Although the shift in economic orientation was Jorge Saba Arbache 327 a response to market closures, it soon developed ideological components, both political and economic.
Credit was provided at subsidized rates and the financial sector was repressed. The relative abundance of credit, along with an overvalued exchange rate, encouraged importing inputs to develop capital-intensive industries. This allowed for considerable industrialization in Brazil and for the decline of agricultural output as a percentage of GDP. The 'infant' industries were protected through a host of measures such as import licenses, tariffs and subsidized interest rates. Unlike the rapidly growing Asian economies, protected industries were not forced to compete in international markets, which had not created an incentive for higher productivity. The ISI favoured high employment and the domestic industry, but at the cost of low levels of efficiency.
Despite the rapid growth of world trade following the Second World War, Brazil was preoccupied with domestic markets. Brazil began to consider exports only in the 1960s. However, the dynamic of the economy was still inward-oriented and institutional incentives allowed the survival of firms that would have been uncompetitive in international markets. The size of Brazil's internal market, the possibility of limited competition and changes in US banking laws encouraged foreign investment. By the 1970s, foreign lending became critical to Brazilian development strategies, which explicitly accepted moderately high levels of inflation -15 per cent to 30 per cent -and increased indebtedness as a fundamental part of the development process. Viewing the oil shocks of the 1970s as short-term disturbances, the government refused to slow down the economy or to correct inflationary distortions and fiscal deficits.
After the second international oil shock, however, policy makers moved from the ISI to a pragmatic economic policy seeking to solve the balance-of-payments and the accelerating inflation problems. In practice, the government alternated measures based on the restriction of demand with expansionist policies. The lack of clear macroeconomic targets is seen as a source of increasing economic instability (see Table 14 .2, which should be referred to for most economic variables addressed in the text).
The debt crisis that followed the Mexican default of 1982 exposed the inconsistencies of the fiscal regime. The sudden halt in international financing of the balance-of-payments deficits called for fiscal adjustment, which, in fact, did not happen. As a consequence, the fiscal and balance-of-payments deficits fuelled inflation and caused widespread demand for indexation, thus accelerating inflation very rapidly in the first half of the 1980s. The re-democratization process in 1985 was followed by expansionist fiscal policies that brought even more inflationary pressures.
The main outcome of the accelerating inflation was an increasing economic instability, which had an impact on economic growth, investments and income inequality. Several desperate stabilization attempts based on price and wage freezes were undertaken between 1986 and 1991, but all failed mainly due to the lack of fiscal adjustment. The impact of economic policy on growth
After decades of rapid growth, there was an abrupt slowdown in the 1980s and the average per capita output growth rate fell to one per cent, compared to 5.9 per cent in the 1970s. The monthly inflation rate series seems to be a mirror image of the quarterly real GDP growth rates series. In other words, it seems that inflation has hindered economic growth. Bugarin et al. (2002) show that the de-trended per working age output dropped 26.5 per cent below the 1992 trend, as compared with 1980, which characterizes economic depression. A sharp drop in output followed the Mexican crisis and, after some recovery, a much stronger drop followed during the period of heterodox stabilization plans. Bugarin et al. (2002) show that the main cause of this output drop was the relative price of investment goods. They argue that the increasing macroeconomic instability caused by the price and wage freezes and fiscal deterioration encouraged economic agents to seek protection for their savings, fuelling the demand for real estate. As a consequence, the price level of the construction sector, which accounts for the largest share of total investments in Brazil, grew much faster than the price level of the economy and gross investment fell from 23.6 per cent in 1980 to 14 per cent in 1992.
Pinheiro (2003) presents a similar story. He conducted a growth accounting decomposition and shows that capital accumulation drops from 4.5 per cent in 1964-80 to 1.3 per cent in 1981-93, accounting for half of the average output growth fall of 6.2 per cent. Total factor productivity (TFP) also fell significantly, from 1.7 per cent to Ϫ0.7 per cent. Capital accumulation, together with TFP, explains 90 per cent of the output growth collapse.
The impact of economic policy on poverty and inequality
After decades of very strong state tutelage, there was an emergence of a new labour union movement in the late 1970s. With the slow re-emergence of democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, unions gained political power and an increasing role in wage determination. As a reaction to accelerating inflation, unions strated to act strategically trying to over-index wages, which intensified an already very unsynchronized wage bargaining process and contributed to the breakdown in the coordination of wage determination.
The different levels of monopolistic product market power, the highly protected and regulated economy, the dominance of state-owned companies in a variety of sectors and the huge informal labour market, which buffers the costs of displacement, provided little incentives for unions to discipline and moderate wage demands. This environment was conducive to the growth of considerable insider power in wage determination, allowing powerful groups of industrial, formal sector workers to secure a share of product market rents through the wage bargaining process and, as a consequence, driving the economy to an increasing income inequality. Yet Arbache (1999) shows that unions are a key variable in explaning wage inequality in Brazil, a result that is at odds with the role they are supposed to play.
The inability of the government to impose fiscal equilibrium, and the deterioration of the economic and political environments, gave scope for strong, self-interested pressure groups acting in a free-rider manner demanding wages, prices and public subsidies in an unco-ordinated way according to their market and political powers. This process would quickly collaborate to a steady acceleration of inflation and further deterioration of fiscal accounts. These developments had potential impacts on the poor, not only because of their inability to secure indexation to inflation, but also because of their higher dependency on the state expenditures and social policies.
The 1981-83 recession that followed the external debt crisis seems to have impacted on poverty. Unemployment rates rose and were accompanied by social disturbances, sacks and pillages. The Plano Cruzado in 1986 gave an immediate gain to the poor due to the income effect observed in the aftermath of freezing prices programmes, and wages and minimum wages were frozen 8 per cent and 16 per cent above their averages, respectively. This measure would not last long, as it reinforced the distributive conflicts that followed the stabilization, eventually bringing the inflation back. Ferreira and Litchfield (1999) show that the increase in inflation in the 1980s helps to explain the rising poverty and inequality. The modesty of the social policies in place and the lack of safety nets made things even harder for the poor. Family consumption remained relatively stable from 1980 to 1986, but there was a substantial drop thereafter. Despite the poverty and inequality indicators, the unemployment rate was relatively low by the end of the 1980s, which resulted from at least three factors: (i) the role of the informal sector in accommodating the unemployed; (ii) the ISI regime, which secured the domestic market for the local firms; and (iii) the populist fiscal policies, which kept public expenditures at high levels.
The 1980s became known as the 'lost decade' because of the combination of GDP stagnation, hyperinflation, increasing income inequality and raising poverty. Its severe economic problems would spill over into the 1990s.
The 1990-2002 period
The economic policy
Trade liberalization
Prior to 1990, the Brazilian economy was highly protected and regulated by virtue of the ISI strategy. Some modest tariff reduction and the lifting of redundant barriers started in 1988. However, the major break with the ISI era began in 1990 under the Collor administration, when efforts to contain inflation were combined with drastic trade liberalization. By the middle of 1993, most of the complex and bureaucratic non-tariff barriers had been removed and a new tariff structure was imposed, which substantially reduced the degree of protectionism. On the export side, subsidies were eliminated and tax incentives were drastically reduced. Although the new tariffs were still relatively high by international standards, the removal of non-tariff barriers shifted the pattern of protection, and signalled that the long period of protectionism was at an end.
Coupled with the appreciation of the exchange rate, trade liberalization led to a significant importation of consumer goods, enhancing the competition in domestic markets and consequently pushing the local firms to improve competitiveness.
The trade flow rose steadily, with imports increasing by 257 per cent and exports by 151 per cent between 1990 and 1996. By 1996, the quantum of imports had increased almost three times. In 1994, the combination of further pragmatic liberalizing measures seeking to discipline domestic prices in the aftermath of the Plano Real and increasing appreciation of the exchange rate affected the trade accounts in such a way that the trade balance started to face growing deficits.
Privatization
Facing imminent hyperinflation and a virtually bankrupt public sector, plans for privatizing public enterprises were launched by the Collor administration in conjunction with a stabilization attempt. Although much of the rhetoric used by advocates of privatization at the time emphasized economic efficiency and competitiveness, privatization is better understood as a desperate response to the deterioration of public finance and the rapid worsening of macroeconomic indicators. Its ultimate aim was to generate fiscal revenues to reduce the public debt and consolidate price stability.
Privatization gained momentum under the first Cardoso administration. The constitutional amendments necessary for privatizing the public monopolies and infrastructure were possible mainly because of the initial success of the Plano Real, which gave the government sufficient power and public support to push for the changes. The government regarded privatization as a key measure for raising revenues and achieving the fiscal discipline needed to maintain the Plano Real, and vital for a sustainable growth.
Between 1990 and 2002, more than 130 state and federal companies were sold, rendering US$105.5 billion in total revenues, which made it one of the largest privatization programmes in the world. These funds played a substantial role in preventing a worsening of the current account deficit and public debt. According to Pinheiro et al. (2001) , the ratio between foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows associated with privatization and current account deficit averaged 25 per cent in 1997-2000. Macedo (2000) argues that privatization had a 'macroeconomic cost' as the enormous proceeds made the government less inclined to pursue fiscal and current accounts adjustments in 1995-98, postponing the needed measures and inflating the costs of the adjustment later. Despite the huge amounts involved, the privatization programme was not sufficient to balance the public accounts, as the increase in the debt surpassed the revenue obtained from privatization.
Deregulation of markets
Major moves towards the deregulation of markets were introduced in 1990. Restrictive rules and laws that had prevented contest in many sectors began to be removed, and price controls and restrictions to entry were eliminated to stimulate competition. Over the following years, the anti-trust legislation was strengthened and modernized, a consumer protection bill was passed, a new legislation on the protection of intellectual property rights was approved in line with the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights-World Trade Organization and measures in several areas were modernized, including remittances of royalties, technology transfers, patents and partnerships. Constitutional amendments were approved, eliminating discrimination against foreign capital in various businesses and discontinuing public monopolies.
With regard to the labour market, some changes were introduced aimed at increasing flexibility of labour relations. In 1994, a bill was passed allowing firms to hire workers through co-operatives. The co-operatives in turn were not obliged to comply with certain labour costs, which in practice meant that employers were allowed to bypass some provisions of the Labour Code. In 1998, a bill was passed allowing part-time labour contracts to be issued.
Stabilization, monetary and exchange rate policies
The Plano Real was introduced during particularly favourable conditions. On the one hand, there was large international financial liquidity, which reduced the external sector constraints. On the other hand, trade and capital account liberalization, privatization and other market reforms were in place, which helped to discipline price formation, attract foreign capital and provide extra revenues for the state. There was recognition that fiscal discipline was critical for the success of stabilization. Indeed, in a low inflationary environment, fiscal disequilibrium soon becomes apparent, and only a new fiscal regime could sustain the Plano Real. Major fiscal reforms were desperately needed, which required constitutional amendments and strong political support. Reforms in areas such as public pension system, social security funding, transfers of funds and division of spending among federal and state authorities, among others, were bringing about the collapse in public finance.
In spite of authorities' commitment to fiscal discipline and to the implementation of reforms, the fiscal accounts went from an operational surplus of 1.57 per cent of GDP in 1994 to a deficit of 5 per cent in 1995. The deterioration of public accounts continued, reaching a deficit of 7.4 per cent in 1998. Amann and Baer (2000) argue that the government's 'soft' approach to fiscal discipline resulted, on the one hand, from the failure of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to secure the fiscal reforms in the Congress, reflecting the lack of political will in his political coalition to cut spending and, on the other hand, from the outcome of the president's relentless pursuit of the constitutional amendment to allow his re-election in 1998. This amendment demanded such intense political negotiations and bargaining that it eventually changed the political agenda, thus delaying fiscal reforms.
In view of the worsening of fiscal accounts, the Plano Real became largely contingent on the role of the exchange rate for maintaining price stability. The interest rates (Selic) were increasingly used to attract foreign capital aimed at keeping the exchange rate anchor. Of course, this regime was unsustainable, especially because the high interest rates were having negative effects on the fiscal accounts, causing severe fiscal disequilibria. The public sector's interest payments jumped from 3 per cent of GDP in 1993 to 5.3 per cent in 1995.
In the external sector, there was a substantial deterioration in the current account resulting from various factors. First, the use of the exchange rate as an anchor to keep inflation down, along with high foreign capital inflows, appreciated the real and causing trade balance disequilibrium (see Chapter 4). Second, there was a substantial increase in interest and dividend payments between 1994 and 1998, reaching 4 per cent of GDP in 1997. Third, after decades of strong protection, the rapid trade liberalization led to high growth in imports. At the same time, poststabilization consumption, investment booms and the expansionist fiscal policy stimulated the growth of imports even further. As a result, the current account increased from a deficit of US$1.8 billion in 1994 to a deficit of US$18.4 billion in 1995. The deficit worsened from then on, reaching US$33.4 billion in 1998.
Indeed, the Plano Real was being sustained at the expense of increasing deterioration of the fiscal and external accounts, compounding what later would bring very serious difficulties to output growth and social indicators. The gradualist policy adopted to tackle the growing macroeconomic imbalances can be explained by the easy access to portfolio capital and increasing FDI inflow. The net FDI-to-current account ratio in 1995 was 18 per cent and reached 78 per cent in 1998. Of course, this strategy could not last long as the increasing dependency on foreign capital to finance the explosive current account deficits made the economy highly vulnerable to external shocks and eventually to speculative attacks.
The Mexican crisis in March 1995 began to bring up uncertainties about the sustainability of the Plano Real. In order to protect the real, the government adopted a tight monetary policy. In the aftermath of the Asian crisis in October 1997, the annualized interest rate reached 42 per cent. In view of the widespread concerns over the macroeconomic indicators and increasing fears of the devaluation of the real, the government was forced to take action with regard to the fiscal deficit and the appreciated exchange rate. Public spending was cut in 1998, generating some improvement in the primary result, while the exchange rate was depreciated.
The Russian crisis in August 1998 forcefully exposed the contradictions of the Plano Real and made the situation unsustainable. The government substantially raised interest rates in a dramatic attempt to maintain the exchange anchor in place, but the measure was useless as investors increasingly believed that a strong devaluation of the real was inevitable. As a result, they started withdrawing funds in large quantities from the country. Between August and September 1998, Brazil lost about US$30 billion in international reserves. The desperate increases in interest rates to save the real in 1997 and 1998 profoundly affected the public accounts, causing public sector interest payments to reach an astonishing 7.4 per cent of GDP in 1998.
In view of the increasing risk of collapse of the economy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the US government announced a large emergency loan of US$41.5 billion to Brazil. In October 1998, just after the reelection of Cardoso, the government proposed major fiscal reforms to the Congress in a desperate attempt to avoid economic collapse. By December, the Congress had approved only part of the proposed reforms, raising expectations of an imminent default. Capital outflows accelerated, depleting international reserves at about US$1 billion a day during the first days of January 1999. In a dramatic and desperate move, the government was forced to allow the exchange rate to float freely in mid-January. This caused the real to overshoot, jumping from 1.21 per dollar before devaluation to 2.06 by February 1999. The devaluation brought immediate changes to the external accounts. Current account deficit diminished rapidly as a result of major cuts in imports and profit remittances and a drastic drop in international travel.
Stringent fiscal measures were taken in 1999. The Congress approved a significant tax raise, an inflation target system was introduced and the interest rate was kept high. By the end of the year, the budget surplus attained was larger than that required by the IMF agreement. Further fiscal measures were introduced over the next years, giving rise to a rapid reduction of the deficit.
Between 2000 and 2002, a series of external factors adversely affected the economic performance of Brazil. Concerns and speculations on the prospects of recovery were renewed. First, the moratorium and deepening of Argentina's crisis -one of Brazil's main trade partners -heavily affected exports. Second, the downturn of the US economy had an adverse impact on the world economy. Third, there were major declines in FDI inflows. Fourth, an unprecedented energy crisis developed because of draught and the paucity of investments, resulting in severe rationing of electricity.
The weak performance of the economy in 2001, the poor post-devaluation export growth and the falling inflow of foreign capital increased anxiety that Brazil, similar to Argentina, might default. As a consequence, there was a substantial reduction in international financing, which led to strong exchange rate depreciations and increased volatility. The exchange rate volatility and the high interest rates affected both the long-term private investments and fiscal accounts, as a substantial amount of the public debt was dollar denominated. The macroeconomic deterioration led to further interest rate hikes, thus reducing the chances of an eventual economic recovery.
In 2002, the prospects that the leftist candidate in the upcoming presidential elections, Lula da Silva, could win soared uncertainties once again. The concerns of a socialist regime and unsound policies led the country-risk ratings to soar to unprecedented levels, bringing additional difficulties to companies and public accounts.
Financial and capital liberalization
In 1991, a series of initiatives towards the liberalization of the capital account were taken, including the opening of the domestic capital market to foreign portfolio investment, the permission given to Brazilian companies to issue different types of securities and bonds abroad and the adoption of tax relief over the issuing of bonds in the international markets as well as over profit remittances and royalties by multinational companies (see Chapters 4 and 5). An additional feature of the financial liberalization includes the increased participation of foreign banks in the domestic market and privatization of state banks. In 1994, some opening to capital outflows was also adopted in view of the massive capital inflow.
As a result of the opening of the capital account, the participation of foreign investors in the volume of transactions in the stock market increased from 6 per cent in 1991 to 30 per cent in 1995. The portfolio investment increased dramatically, going from an average of minus US$221 million per year in the 1980s to US$12 billion per year in 1990-2002. Foreign investors were granted the right to participate in privatization, and by 2002 their share in the total privatization proceeds reached 48 per cent, amounting to about US$50 billion. This was a substantial change in view of the long-established position among influent politicians and business leaders who maintained that the greater participation of foreign capital could end up denationalizing the economy. The government varied the degree of controls over external borrowing and investment in bonds for macroeconomic management purposes, and taxation and maturity have been used to control capital flows.
The capital account liberalization, privatization of major utility sectors and the foundation of Mercosur in 1991 played a substantial role in attracting FDI to Brazil, as many multinational companies made the country the regional export base for Mercosur. From 1990 to 1995, the net inflow of FDI was, on average, US$1.5 billion per year. From 1996 to 1999, it jumped to an average of US$21.8 billion per year and reached US$32.8 billion in 2000. Since then, FDI inflows have reduced as a consequence of the slowdown of the privatization programme and the economic and political crisis.
It has to be stressed that the capital account liberalization was implemented before the major liberalization of the trade account and the price stabilization, which does not fit the classical order of sequencing and timing of reforms that calls for stabilization coming first and the opening of trade and capital accounts last.
The impacts of economic policy on growth
The delay of fiscal adjustment and conflicts over policy reforms created an atmosphere of unsustainable macroeconomic deterioration that could not last long. The rising uncertainties about the sustainability of the Plano Real had stringent effects on the prospects of growth. Since the end of 1997, the investment-to-GDP ratio triggered a period of contraction and was one immediate cause of vulnerability of the real. After the collapse of the real in early 1999, the rising costs of investment and input goods, the very high interest rates, the implementation of an enormous fiscal adjustment and the unfinished regulatory system for utilities and infrastructure added to the main causes of investment stagnation.
It seems that the disappointing post-reform output growth is explained by the sequencing of policy reform issues, political economy constraints and the timing when the reforms were introduced. One critical sequencing issue is the fact that the stabilization-cum-exchange rate nominal anchor was introduced after, and not before, trade liberalization, hence in opposition to the long-established consensus of policy literature (Edwards 1994; Krueger 1981) . The appreciation of the exchange rate prior to stabilization made the anti-export bias created by the nominal anchor larger than it would have been otherwise. It was subsequently reinforced by the long period of appreciation after Plano Real. The sizeable FDI and portfolio capital inflow favoured by capital account liberalization and privatization in the aftermath of Plano Real also contributed to keeping the real appreciated. As productivity increases take time to materialize and the reallocation of resources is a slow and long process, especially in a country such as Brazil that had been long protected from imports, the trade-off between the exchange rate used to steer inflation down and to guide the reallocation of resources was counter-productive for improving exports. The obvious outcome was a rapid worsening of the current accounts, which ultimately constrained the output growth potential. Unfortunately, Brazil repeated the earlier policy mistakes made by other Latin American countries in their stabilization attempts, but with the aggravated implications of inducing a stagnant economic cycle and exposing the economy to speculative attacks in a liberalized financial market framework.
Another critical issue for growth is related to fiscal accounts. Serious fiscal adjustment was left until after stabilization. Thus, the fiscal adjustment required in the aftermath of the Plano Real was huge and difficult to implement. It appears that the government overestimated its capacity to control fiscal accounts and to have the Congress pass fiscal reforms in such a short time. Instead of surpluses, the post-Plano Real period witnessed explosive operational public deficits, revealing the inconsistency of fiscal budgets in the inflationary era. The rise in interest rates to finance balance-of-payment deficits with portfolio capital affected public accounts and aggravated the fiscal disequilibria. The unwillingness of politicians to adopt the measures necessary to achieve fiscal discipline delayed the essential reforms and added to the costs of adjustment. At the time, the 'way out' for fiscal adjustment was not to rely on inflation tax, as had been done in previous decades, but to take advantage of the success of Plano Real to resort to obtain funding from both local and foreign financial markets, at the cost of worsening fiscal and current accounts.
Trade liberalization and deregulation of capital seem to have had some impacts on productivity and efficiency. Technology transfers and diffusion from abroad rose from 0.04 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 0.35 per cent in 1999. New methods of production and management were introduced, which led to an increase in a variety of goods and improvements in quality. Ferreira and Rossi (2003) find evidence that the fall of tariffs and import penetration increased TFP growth in manufacturing. Hay (2001) analyses a set of large manufacturing firms and finds substantial productivity growth after openness and evidence of a fall in profits and market shares. Muendler (2004) investigates TFP change and finds that the removal of tariffs and import penetration induced firms to rationalize and forced less competitive firms to exit the market, thus leading to the rise in TFP. If, on the one hand, the opening facilitated the access to capital and new technologies, on the other hand, it imposed a heavy cost to the least advanced firms, as a significant share of them went bankrupt in the early years after the Plano Real. Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003) assess the impacts of privatization on efficiency and output of former state-owned enterprises and find indications of increased profitability and reduced operating costs. Danni (2004) shows that the provision of utilities and services grew after privatization. Carvalho (2001) observes that the privatization programme improved the managerial practices and efficiency, reduced public debtalbeit much less than anticipated earlier, reorganized the public finances of the federative states and reduced the public debt interest payments in the short and long run, versus the levels they would have been in the absence of privatization.
Despite the modernization of the economy, the average growth rate of the postreform period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) was 1.97 per cent, lower than the 1980-89 figure of 3.02 per cent, and far below the historical rate of 5.34 per cent . A decomposition of the output growth shows that if TFP growth had not increased, the economy would have experienced a sharp depression in the postreform period. The investment-to-GDP ratio remained at around 19 per cent. The stagnation in investments is somewhat puzzling, as openness, privatization, stabilization and deregulation of markets are often assumed to reduce the prices of investment goods and create business opportunities, the elements needed to encourage capital accumulation. In fact, the evidence for Brazil suggests that structural reforms seem to be conducive to growth, but do not cause growth.
The impact of economic policy on poverty and inequality
The labour market indicators experienced substantial changes in 1990-2002. By 2002, more than half of the labour force was employed in the informal sector, unemployment was at a very high level, about 12 per cent; and real average wage had lost 15 per cent of its purchasing power compared with 1997. The causes of such deterioration are certainly associated with the country's mediocre economic growth.
A significant drop in poverty occurred just after the Plano Real in mid-1994, and since then the indigence and poverty lines have remained stable. Income concentration remained very high and stable, at around 0.6. In the aftermath of the Plano Real, consumption experienced an unprecedented boom. From the second quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 1995, family consumption rose by 3 per cent of GDP, mainly a reflection of the purchasing-power gains of the lower income groups. As they had no or very limited access to mechanisms to protect their consumption from inflation, stabilization gave them a one-time real income raise. Workers at the lowest income decile experienced a 100 per cent rise in income in the first year of the Plano Real, while workers at the second lowest decile enjoyed a 46 per cent rise (Rocha 2000) . The euphoria of post-Plano Real, accompanied by expansionary fiscal policies, fuelled the average growth rate during 1994 and 1995 to 5 per cent. As a result, the proportion of people below the poverty line fell from 43 per cent in 1993 to 35 per cent in 1995, remaining at this level thereafter.
Empirical literature shows that wages in the traded sector were substantially harmed by openness (Arbache et al. 2004) . This is consistent with the evidence that the reforms raised the degree of competition in the traded industries and thereby reduced bargaining power of workers and rent sharing. Green et al. (2001) find evidence of skill-biased technical change as a result of trade openness, and that it prevented reduction in wage inequality. Maia and Arbache (2001) investigate the sources of employment changes and find that imports accounted for the destruction of 1.97 million jobs, while technological changes eliminated 4.9 million jobs between 1985 and 1995, most of them unskilled jobs. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that trade and capital liberalization benefited skilled workers and was not conducive to income inequality reduction, as one could expect based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. As the compression of margins tends to reflect increased competition in the domestic market, the above results can be explained by the introduction of new technology, rationalization of production, better management, outsourcing and turnover. The exit of the least competitive firms and the high interest rates in the Plano Real era may have imposed an asymmetric distribution of the burden on unskilled workers and on small manufacturing businesses, as they tend to be employed in such firms.
Mota (2003) runs a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the impacts of privatization of the electricity supply and finds that most efficiency gains from privatization went to the benefit of the producers. Danni (2004) finds that privatization of communications and energy increased the provision of fixed phone lines and distribution of energy and that the poor were the main beneficiaries. Thus, it seems that increased coverage after privatization played a role in improving the well-being of the poor. Fiani (2002) shows that the residential energy cost was subjected to a 40 per cent rise above the consumer price index between 1995 and 2002, while the industry energy cost dropped 60 per cent below the industrial price index. The fixed billing charge for energy distribution and fixed residential telephone connections also increased sharply after privatization, imposing a regressive cost on the poor. As a result, the share of utilities in the budget of the poor may have risen after privatization. These results suggest that privatization had both positive and negative effects on poverty.
The 2003-2004 period The economic policy
The incoming government decided to maintain the orthodox economic policy orientation that was in place. This was perhaps a reaction to the very harsh economic conditions and to the suspicion of the investors that the Labor Party could follow a heterodox economic agenda. As a matter of fact, the primary fiscal surplus target set by the previous government was elevated significantly, and the central bank was given some independence to guide the monetary policy. The novelty brought by the new government was the intention to combine fiscal discipline with a social agenda.
The high interest rates used as a means to control the inflation pressures have had at least two side effects: an impact on public debt and on the exchange rate. It is estimated that for every one per cent rise of the Selic, the annual debt service increases by about R$6.7 billion. On the external side, the high real interest rates attracted portfolio investment, thus appreciating the exchange rate and harming the competitiveness of exports. Yet the average nominal exchange rate fell from R$3.08 in 2003 to R$2.92 in 2004. In January 2005 it was R$2.69, and in early November it was about R$2.25. The Lula da Silva administration seems to be replicating the mistakes of the previous government in regard to interest and exchange rates. While it may be somehow effective to control inflation in the short run, in the medium term it potentially affects the fiscal and the external accounts, thus compromising growth and poverty reduction.
Despite the appreciation of the real, the exports have boomed, partly due to the very favourable prices of agricultural, live stock and mineral commodities, and of some semi-manufactured goods such as steel and cellulose. From 2002 to 2004, the total exports rose by 60 per cent, contributing to significant surpluses in the current accounts and alleviating the always troublesome balance-of-payments situation.
The social security has been an important source of fiscal concerns, as it has presented growing deficits. This was caused by various reasons, including the huge informal sector, the demographic transition, the establishment of social benefits and retirement rights for rural workers, elderly people and disabled people (who have never contributed) and the increasing disequilibria in the public sector pension system. According to Portela et al. (2004) , in the last few years the nominal deficit of the social security has amounted to more than 4 per cent of GDP, and the estimated implicit deficit for the next few years is expected to reach 7 per cent of GDP, thus combining the debt service with the main fiscal constraints.
With regard to the social agenda, Lula da Silva established the Bolsa Família, a combination of social projects intended to tackle starvation and misery, and also to bring the poor to the markets through credit to informal workers, small urban entrepreneurs and family farming, training programmes, bolsa-escola and compensatory programmes, among other measures.
One way to fund a social agenda is through tax increases. However, during recent years the tax burden increased immensely, going from 29 per cent in 1998 to 34 per cent in 2004, which is seen as a response to the public accounts disequilibria. In 2003, the total deficit was about 3.7 per cent of GDP, and in 2004 it was estimated to be 3.5 per cent. Thus, the tax burden plus the nominal deficit amounted to about 38.5 per cent of GDP. In view of the fiscal constraints and the firm decision of the government to keep inflation at low levels, funding an ambitious pro-poor programme was the highest challenge of the government.
The impact of the economic policy on growth, poverty and inequality
The GDP growth of 2003 was 0.54 per cent, a consequence of the economic crisis of the previous year and the tough fiscal and monetary policies in place. The GDP growth of 2004 was 4.9 per cent, a quite high figure if compared to the rates observed in the previous two decades. It has often been questioned whether the economy is able to keep growing at similar figures because of the low investment rates and the severe bottlenecks in infrastructure.
In regard to social indicators, there is some sign of improvements. Although unemployment remained high, it dropped from 12. 
Policy alternatives
This section discusses micro and macro policy alternatives that pursue policies protective of the poor.
Output growth and poverty
In view of the developments of the social indicators presented above, it is hard to say that poverty is a hot policy issue in Brazil. One obvious reason for the poor social indicators is the low growth rates observed over the last two decades. Figure 14 .1 shows the per capita output growth rate, and the dotted line is a thirdorder polynomial trend. The instantaneous rate of growth of the per capita output during the whole period was 2.84 per cent. In 1947-79, it was 4.2 per cent; it then declined sharply to 0.7 per cent in 1980-2004; and, finally, it reached a disappointing 0.5 per cent in the post-Plano Real period. The macro policies implemented since the 1980s were not able to reverse the long-term trend of declining output growth. The lack of a clear focus and the inability to follow the sequencing of reforms as discussed above is perhaps responsible for the stops-and-goes and the lack of coherent economic policies. Figure 14 .2 presents the fitted and actual logarithm of the per capita output. The fitted line can be interpreted as the (linear) long-term trend of the per capita output. Two points seem to emerge. First, taking the fitted line as a reference, Brazil has experienced long economic cycles over the last several decades. Second, after a strong boom, the economy has entered in a stagnant period since 1980, and the fitted-actual gap has been increasing since 1990, thus suggesting an economic depression. Certainly, policies intended to seriously tackle poverty and inequality are more difficult to gather political support in such a stagnant economy. In such an environment, fiscal policies may be needed to resume economic growth, reduce growth volatility and, above all, protect the very poor and the least skilled from economic downturns, as they seem to have been disproportionately affected by the economic reforms. In view of the fiscal constraints, however, additional measures to boost growth have to be considered, and export promotion is perhaps among the best bets. 1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 (the correlation coefficient is Ϫ0.79). Thus, policies that boost growth seem to be good for the poor. However, as poverty indicators remained relatively stable over growing periods, growth should be viewed as a necessary, although not a sufficient condition to tackle poverty.
Income distribution and poverty
It has been found that income concentration is one of the main causes of poverty in Brazil. Barros et al. (2001) find that if it were possible to identify all the extremely poor and poor people, extreme poverty could be significantly reduced at the cost of only about R$6 billion a year, thus revealing the low cost of eradicating misery; and 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 that poverty levels are much more sensitive to changes in the degree of inequality than to changes in economic growth. So, if poverty were not so responsive to inequality, the correlation between output growth and poverty would perhaps be stronger. Menezes-Filho and Vasconcelos (2004) estimate the growth elasticity of poverty in Brazilian states as Ϫ0.9. When they control for inequality, the growth coefficient goes to Ϫ1.0 and the inequality coefficient is 2.3. If initial conditions of income and inequality by state are controlled for, then the growth elasticity of poverty rises to Ϫ1.8, while the inequality coefficient is 2.6, meaning that the poverty reduction effect of growth is much higher when the initial level of income is high and lower when initial inequality is high. These results support those of Barros et al. (2001) that poverty is more responsive to inequality changes than to growth changes. An implication of this result is that growth may be positively correlated with inequality. Accordingly, Menezes-Filho and Vasconcelos (2004) estimate regressions of Gini and other variables on output growth and find that inequality is positively correlated to growth. These results are illustrative of the pattern of growth developed in Brazil and calls for changes of the growth model. Barros et al. (2000) estimate the unemployment elasticity of poverty using monthly data from six metropolitan areas for the period 1982-98. The measure of poverty is the average income gap. The coefficient of unemployment estimated is 1.47. Barros et al. also estimate a series of local regressions using a 36-month observation. The average coefficient of unemployment for 1984-89 -one of increasing inflation -is 1.3. During 1990-92, a period marked by recession and increasing inflation, the mean coefficient scaled to 1.6. From early 1993 until mid-1996, a period of strong decline of inflation and rising growth rates, the mean coefficient dropped steadily, averaging 0. This result may capture the income effect of the Plano Real, and the relatively low unemployment rates of the period. Thereafter, the local coefficients increased monotonically and very rapidly, possibly reflecting the rising unemployment rates and the economic stagnation.
These results suggest that fighting poverty based solely on economic growth may produce slow changes in social indicators, especially in view of the low per capita growth observed in the last few decades. The implications are important, as they suggest that actions aimed at eradicating poverty must include strategies to reduce inequality. Some of the distributional policy alternatives are minimum wage rise, progressive income taxation, increasing opportunities for human capital formation and the improvement of sectors that absorb proportionately more unskilled labour, among others.
Fiscal accounts, stabilization, interest rate and exchange rate
The fiscal disequilibria have been the key economic characteristic of the last few decades in Brazil, and are among the main causes of the country's persistent inflation and economic instability. In the post-Plano Real, the increasing deterioration of the fiscal accounts has constrained growth through the 'crowding-out' effect on interest rates and investment. As a side effect, the high interest rate has attracted portfolio capital, thus appreciating the exchange rate and harming growth.
Economists have been arguing that solving the fiscal disequilibria is fundamental for cutting interest rates and attracting long-term investments, and the way out most often proposed is cutting government expenditures. If, on the one hand, it is healthy for long-term growth, on the other hand, demand compression and public expenditures cuts disproportionately harm the poor. Thus, the issue is one of how to conciliate the short-term versus long-term policy targets.
In the last few years, the inflation rate has remained relatively high and above the ambitious inflation targets set by the central bank. As a result, a very orthodox monetary policy has been put in place to contain inflation. Yet Brazil has had one of the highest real interest rates in the world. An inflation target policy will be effective if prices are sensitive to interest and to demand reduction and the credit is rationed. These outcomes have not been the case, however, as low-interest credit has increased dramatically for pensioners and civil servants -the pension and salary are used as a collateral -and several key prices, such as privatized utilities and public services, are highly indexed. Franco (2004) finds that the interest rate set by the central bank is strongly sensitive to inflation. He shows that for every percentage point of inflation, interest raises by 1.77 per cent. The output gap coefficient, however, is Ϫ0.72, suggesting that the central bank's policy is not only unresponsive of unemployment, but is also not counter-cyclical as one could expect from a pro-poor macro policy. Franco (2004) also shows that the interest rate policy is guided by the deviation of the expected inflation to the inflation target. Certainly, in the presence of an opened capital account, a tough monetary policy can cause deleterious impacts on growth and fiscal accounts and expose the economy to speculative attacks and shocks. On the one hand, the high interest rates increase the public debt, thus pushing the debt service up. On the other hand, the high interest rate attracts portfolio capital. Thus, the monetary and fiscal policies seem to reinforce the fiscal disequilibria and the exchange rate appreciation, driving the country into a low-growth trap.
Policies aimed at breaking the low-growth trap have to consider generating, in the short run, considerable fiscal primary surpluses, additional policies to containing inflation apart from interest rate rises and exchange rate appreciation, and consolidating the trade account surpluses as a way to reduce the external shocks and the foreign capital dependency. In such an unequal society with its lack of social cohesion, the political economy challenges are how to promote fiscal cuts without imposing extra burdens onto the poor and on policies directed to increasing long-term productivity and competitiveness.
Integrating the poor to the markets
According to what has been discussed above, the eradication of poverty should not rely solely on growth. Moreover, the extent to which growth favours the poor depends heavily upon the level of markets integration and on their imperfections. In less integrated or segmented markets, the benefits of growth may not be shared by all, or are unevenly shared. Some obvious examples are labour market discrimination and restrictions to credit and market access. Certainly, in such environment sound macroeconomic policies alone may not be enough to successfully reduce poverty. A promising approach to tackle poverty is integrating and coordinating macro with micro policies that challenge the structural determinants of poverty, engage the poor into the markets in permanent basis, facilitate their access to technologies and remove imperfections of markets functioning (see Chapter 1).
Market integration is essential for the poor to be able to develop their businesses, get contracts, enhance the value of their assets and, above all, benefit from the economic growth. Empirical evidence, however, shows that the markets in which the poor are found in Brazil are not fully integrated into the rest of the economy. One piece of evidence refers to the long time that the poverty and inequality indices have remained stable. This stability could be a consequence of the isolation of the poor people from the credit, education, raw materials, goods and services markets. If this isolation raises the costs of obtaining, say, education, then the accumulation of human capital can become economically infeasible. But this isolation can also result from the lack of infrastructure, transport, communications and electrical energy, among other public services, which isolate the poor in their regions and keep them away from new technologies. This would be the case in rural areas and in the small towns spread throughout the country, and can be seen as one reason for the failure of many settlements set up under the umbrella of agrarian reform that have become economically unviable.
The main obstacle that prevents the poor having access to the markets and the one that makes it more difficult for them to benefit from economic growth in Brazil is perhaps the low level of qualification and schooling. Brazil has one of the highest adult illiteracy rates in Latin America, and one of the lowest average schooling rates among middle-income countries -4.5 years in 2000. Education improves productivity, opens up opportunities for access to good jobs and increases income. Education is found to be the most important factor to explain wage and income inequality in Brazil -it explains the 48 per cent wage inequality and the 26 per cent income inequality (Barros and Mendonça 1995) -and the return rate for each additional year of schooling is about 16 per cent, one of the highest in the world. The main way to overcome this obstacle is to distribute education better. The distribution of education is not transferable, is reproducible and can, for this reason, contribute towards reducing inequalities and poverty at large. The problem of using education as a tool to fight poverty, however, is that it is a long-term approach to affecting poverty and inequality and does not solve the problem of poverty and misery, which requires short-term measures.
Final remarks
This chapter examined the economic policies implemented in Brazil in the last 25 years and commented on their failures, weaknesses and impacts on the poor. After a long period of inward-oriented strategy and a series of policy mistakes, the economy ended up in external debt crisis, hyperinflation, slowdown of growth, high poverty levels and increasing inequality. Brazil then undertook structural reforms in line with the Washington Consensus aimed at promoting growth and fighting poverty. If the standard market-oriented reforms had been adequate to boost growth and social conditions, Brazil would have grown at higher rates and improved social indicators. Therefore, it can be said that structural reforms are not a panacea. They may contribute to growth and fight poverty, but only if supported by macro-and microeconomic policies tailor made to address the country's characteristics and needs, and if they are biased toward the poor.
Some points seem to emerge from the Brazilian case: (i) growth is necessary but not sufficient to reduce poverty; (ii) fighting income inequality seems to be essential for reducing poverty; (iii) sound fiscal and monetary policies are essential to growth; and (iv) policies aimed at engaging the poor into the markets seem to be promising for reducing poverty on a permanent basis and enabling them to benefit from growth. Therefore, in order to make growth more pro-poor, it is important that growth be achieved with a decline in income inequality and with more and better opportunities for the poor to benefit from economic growth.
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